{"id":187,"date":"2013-11-27T19:18:05","date_gmt":"2013-11-27T19:18:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/?p=187"},"modified":"2013-11-28T13:32:00","modified_gmt":"2013-11-28T13:32:00","slug":"the-iran-nuclear-deal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/?p=187","title":{"rendered":"The Iran Nuclear Deal"},"content":{"rendered":"

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It is difficult to be categorical when judging this agreement.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Much depends upon huge uncertainties that will play out over years or decades.\u00a0 American politicians are condemned to focus on near-term costs and consequences.\u00a0 Our system tends to discount the future very heavily\u2014election cycles, business cycles, news cycles all drive decision-making focus on the near term.\u00a0 We do not play a long game very well (if at all)<\/strong>.\u00a0 We tend to buy time in small increments.<\/p>\n

Still, gazing further into the future, it is not hard to see a world where the US and Iran have more extensive relations\u2014particularly economic.\u00a0 The very youthful Iranian population will grow up.\u00a0 It\u2019s hard to see the next generation following the same path as the current Iranian leaders.<\/p>\n

But you have to get to that future without things going horribly wrong.<\/p>\n

Judging the immediate position regarding the narrow (but important) issue of Iran\u2019s nuclear program should account for a few facts.<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. This isn\u2019t like Iraq.<\/strong>\u00a0 There really is an Iranian nuclear program that is very advanced.\u00a0 Iran has a very large nuclear infrastructure covering all aspects of nuclear work\u2014whether peaceful or military.\u00a0 Iran has the capacity to make nuclear weapons.\u00a0 It is just a question of will.<\/li>\n
  2. We do not know how much work Iran has done to develop a nuclear warhead.<\/strong>\u00a0 The US was convinced there was a \u201cweaponization program\u201d that was suspended or otherwise halted (probably only temporarily) in 2003 coincident with the US invasion of Iraq.\u00a0 Maybe they thought they were next.\u00a0 Who knows?\u00a0 The point is that no one other than the Iranians knows how developed and how well-tested a weapon design may be.\u00a0 The recent agreement does nothing to answer this question.\u00a0 In fact, one of the key items the IAEA seeks to clarify is just this point.\u00a0 They have sought access to a military site (Parchin) where reports indicate Iran conducted explosive testing that would only be done for a nuclear weapon development program.\u00a0 Iran must come clean on the status of its weaponization work if the international community (and the IAEA) wants to have effective monitoring in the future.\u00a0 This is vital.<\/strong><\/li>\n
  3. Iran must declare all its enrichment capacity\u2014to include centrifuge production capacity and parts.\u00a0 <\/strong>To be able to monitor compliance in the future, there must be a solid baseline understanding of all enrichment capacity, not just the designated sites.<\/li>\n
  4. Don\u2019t forget Iran has long-range ballistic missile programs that appear best suited for nuclear warheads.<\/strong>\u00a0 Those programs are continuing in earnest.\u00a0 We are not talking about a country like Japan that has the talent and wherewithal to make nuclear weapons, but does not choose to compete in the military realm.\u00a0 It makes its mark economically.<\/li>\n
  5. What are the objectives of a deal with Iran?<\/strong>\u00a0 It is unclear what the explicit goal of a final agreement is.\u00a0 Is the goal to remove all Iranian capacity to enrich Uranium (or make plutonium)?\u00a0 Or is the goal to cause Iran to have a detectable \u201cbreakout\u201d time of no less than some period of time?<\/li>\n
  6. There is a trade-off between enrichment and the need for very intrusive inspections.<\/strong>\u00a0 If Iran had no enrichment capacity, then monitoring for a weapons program is much easier.\u00a0 However, once some type of enrichment is accepted, then the pressures to conduct very intrusive monitoring go up substantially.\u00a0 This is a trade that negotiators may put to Tehran.\u00a0 If they want to enrich, then they should accept a very intrusive inspection regime.\u00a0\u00a0 If they do not want highly intrusive inspections, then they should relinquish enrichment capacity.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    \u00a0<\/strong>Some other considerations<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

    Iran may have viewed the recent Syrian decision regarding its Chemical Weapons programs as an indicator that cooperation on WMD will buy them legitimacy.\u00a0 Iran might also have concluded that a US military strike against Iran was really unlikely.\u00a0 The spectacle of President Obama going to congress to get authorization for a limited bombing mission in Syria (and failure being all be assured) communicated something\u2014probably not strength.\u00a0 On the other hand, the strong sanctions put together over both the Bush and Obama administrations with international support is quite a powerful tool.\u00a0 As we learned after the invasion of Iraq, Saddam\u2019s highest priority was to get out of sanctions.\u00a0 Incrementally he gave up his WMD to that end\u2026the problem was no one believed him (and, of course, Saddam was going to rebuild his WMD capacity as soon as conditions permitted\u2014this is the part many tend to forget).<\/p>\n

    The US is not in a strong position on Iran.\u00a0 This administration is focused on domestic issues.\u00a0 It seems international issues are evaluated first on their domestic consequences.\u00a0 That is not unusual, but when President Obama says \u201call options are on the table,\u201d it does not mean the same thing as when President Bush said the same.<\/p>\n

    Moreover, an objective assessment of the US role in the region would have to consider that the US is simply not as dominant as it was.\u00a0 We are withdrawing though we don\u2019t say that.\u00a0 We are less needful of imported oil.\u00a0 Our policies have tended to undermine long-time allies.\u00a0 Many countries, particularly the Gulf States are realizing they are on their own and should not count of the US for support or leadership that suits them.\u00a0 The world has changed.\u00a0 Russia, China, France and others are rising in influence.<\/p>\n

    Under the circumstances, maybe we were lucky to get as good a deal as we got.\u00a0<\/strong> To get to the point of a final deal that is verifiable and truly removes any near term risk of an Iranian nuclear weapon will require a lot more.<\/p>\n

    Finally, once sanctions are off, no matter what anyone says, it will be near impossible to put them back on. \u00a0This was the elephant in the room during Security Council debates concerning Iraq’s compliance with WMD. \u00a0No one really believed that once sanctions were lifted, Saddam wouldn’t reconstruct his programs. \u00a0And there would not be the will to reimpose sanctions once the world was re-engaged in commerce with this wealthy country. \u00a0That was Saddam’s strategy and, absent the changed world after 9-11, it probably would have worked.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        It is difficult to be categorical when judging this agreement. Much depends upon huge uncertainties that will play out over years or decades.\u00a0 American politicians are condemned to focus on near-term costs and consequences.\u00a0 Our system tends to … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[71,70,19,74],"tags":[43,42],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/187"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=187"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/187\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":189,"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/187\/revisions\/189"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=187"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=187"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.charlesduelfer.com\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=187"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}