Is Lavrov the New Baghdad Bob? Saddam’s <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Saddam’s last information minister and a former foreign minister was Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf–better known in Western Press as “Baghdad Bob”. He was ridiculed for his blatant incorrect statements about the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Putin’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is making statements that have a similar truth quotient. Why? Maybe survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One of the good things that came out of the most Iraq war was the detailed recording of the decision processes of the Saddam regime.\u00a0 We obtained incredible detail on how Saddam made decisions and why.\u00a0 There are striking similarities between Putin\u2019s regime and Saddam\u2019s.\u00a0 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This was plainly visible in Putin\u2019s televised Security Council meeting with his advisors.\u00a0 The image of Putin receiving a series of obsequious bobble heads was a mirror image of Saddam surrounded by his lieutenants at his Revolutionary Command Council.\u00a0 They were there to reinforce the position of the leader and share the blame and guilt.\u00a0 \u00a0 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Of course, the big difference is Saddam didn\u2019t have WMD but Putin does.\u00a0 So this is far worse, but we\u2019ll come back to that. \u00a0 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Saddam, in his post war debriefings spoke to many of the same problems that we now see in Putin\u2019s regime.\u00a0 Saddam correctly observed that his access to honest information and judgments was skewed by the fears of the people around him.\u00a0 They did not want to present bad news.\u00a0 He belatedly understood the system did not serve him.\u00a0 Of course, he didn\u2019t quite blame himself for the system. \u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Likewise, the coterie around Putin constitutes the same problem. They too, are snared by Putin\u2019s mixture of rewards and fears, and behave accordingly. \u00a0No one stood up and said, \u201cHey boss, this sounds a little wobbly to me\u2026uhhh.\u201d\u00a0 \u00a0 Saddam\u2019s leadership deliberations prior to invading Kuwait suffered from the distortions of a leader accustomed to few if any constraints and servants with no rights other than those given by the dictator.\u00a0 Hence, discussions over invading Kuwait had a decidedly muted aura with respect to highlighting the downsides.\u00a0 The script of Putin\u2019s regarding Ukraine was, if anything, even more limited. \u00a0 Those who surrounded Saddam accrued wealth and power, but were subject to the fear of sudden demise.\u00a0 The only difference between Saddam\u2019s inner circle and Putin\u2019s was the inclusion of his family. Otherwise, Saddam\u2019s bubble and Putin\u2019s share similar characteristics in the effect on the leader. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Both leaders have existed in the absence of outside constraints.\u00a0 No one said, \u201cYou can\u2019t do that.\u201d \u00a0 Saddam\u2019s worldview (as he acknowledged in debriefings) was incorrect and he partially acknowledged this was due to people around him fearing to accurately inform him. \u00a0 Those around him were handcuffed to Saddam\u2019s visions and illusions.\u00a0 Saddam thought Iraq deserved be the dominant Arab country in the region.\u00a0 He was the successor to Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, and Saladin.\u00a0 It was his destiny to defeat the Persians. \u00a0His aides did not constrain their \u201cvisionary\u201d leader although some saw faults and dangers on the horizon.\u00a0 The same seems true regarding Czar Vladimir Putin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As for the aides, their fate is difficult to disconnect from the leader. A limited few escaped Saddam\u2019s fate at the end. Those who left early did better. Putin\u2019s inner circle confronts a similar dilemma.\u00a0 They may see a looming disaster, but may not be able to affect it or escape it. They are chained to the decisions of Putin.\u00a0 They may wishfully think Putin\u2019s vision for a greater Russia will succeed. Those with younger children who have been schooled in the West and who anticipate a future beyond Putin’s life span or reign must harbor some gnawing doubts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time their options to affect their futures will shrink.\u00a0 They are the frogs in the slowly heating pan of water.\u00a0 It is a classic problem, realized too late by too many. \u00a0 The fate of dictators soldiers is not good. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Years ago, a friend told me of advice shared between Saddam\u2019s daughter and Qaddafi\u2019s son during the uprising in Libya.\u00a0 Reportedly she said, you have to get out now, while you can. Things will only get worse and end badly.\u00a0 This was good advice.\u00a0 The same may apply to those around Putin\u2014but it may be too late. \u00a0Putin\u2019s coterie has diminishing options to do things to improve their own and\/or their family\u2019s future. \u00a0 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
So what?\u00a0\u00a0 Why should we care?\u00a0 The reason we must care comes back to the one essential difference between Saddam and Putin\u2014nuclear weapons.\u00a0 Putin knows the calculus of nuclear war.\u00a0 The cold war period of his youth seems to be the world he wants to rebuild.\u00a0 \u00a0 The \u201cbalance of terror\u201d of nuclear weapons poses the insoluble dilemma that allows a fundamentally weaker nation to stand up to a larger more successful nation.\u00a0 Putin can demonstrate that he is willing to risk far more than the US and its allies to achieve his objectives.\u00a0 The old Cold War question resurfaces, \u201cWill you trade New York for Paris?\u201d \u00a0If Putin assumes the role of irrational actor plays chicken wearing a blindfold, we have an existential problem. \u00a0 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Many have forgotten the complexity and delicacy of nuclear retaliatory response forces.\u00a0\u00a0 It is a global system of satellites, radars, warning systems communications, airborne command systems, submarines, missiles, etc. The safety and security systems for nuclear weapons are rightfully extraordinary.\u00a0 To raise their alert levels is a major step.\u00a0 Ultimately, the trigger pull at higher alert levels becomes extremely delicate.\u00a0 If our sensors detect a long range ballistic missile launch, it must be seen and rapidly categorized in terms of type and impact prediction.\u00a0 A threat judgment must be made and communicated to the President so that a response decision can be made\u2014within the flight time of the missile and Washington\u2014roughly 30 minutes.\u00a0 Things can go badly wrong and nearly have in the past.\u00a0 The potential for error in such complicated systems is not trivial.\u00a0\u00a0 The Administration postponed a regular test flight of an unarmed ICBM, presumably to reduce the risk of sending an inadvertent signal that could be misinterpreted by Moscow. \u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the past, some near calamities (besides the Cuban missile crisis) have occurred when intelligence, either technical or human, provided indications that were misinterpreted as threats.\u00a0 In these cases, humans made judgments that a nuclear response wrong.\u00a0 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
For this reason, individuals in the chain of command or in a position to influence the command authority can be vital. \u00a0 If Putin believes his supernatural boldness can restore the position of the former Soviet Union by risking a nuclear exchange, we may need those around Putin.\u00a0 Those individuals may be extremely important\u2014sooner rather than later.\u00a0 They need to know that their interests and global security interests align.\u00a0 We need to message those around Putin as well as Putin.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Is Lavrov the New Baghdad Bob? Saddam’s Saddam’s last information minister and a former foreign minister was Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf–better known in Western Press as “Baghdad Bob”. He was ridiculed for his blatant incorrect statements about the American led invasion … Continue reading