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Lot\u2019s of analysts are creating analyses of Vladimir Putin.\u00a0 What drives him? What are his objectives? Is he psycho?\u00a0 The fact is, no one really knows.\u00a0 Analysis that was likewise wobbly surrounded Saddam in his day. It was off the mark and a bad basis for making policy decisions.\u00a0 Unfortunately, the error band on anticipating a particular leader\u2019s intentions or action is very large. \u00a0It\u2019s hard to predict behavior of a single person. \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n What\u2019s worse is when the consequences of a single decision-maker are huge. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Consider this. Martin Indyk has written a fascinating and very detailed examination of Henry Kissinger\u2019s diplomatic history, called \u201cMaster of the Game.\u201d<\/strong> Indyk was a participant in much of what he describes. And he meticulously sources his content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a chapter called DEFCOM-3, he describes the interactions of the various actors during the October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War.\u00a0 Anwar Sadat\u2019s Egyptian army surprised Israel and the Israeli army was not holding its own.\u00a0 The superpowers were involved on opposite sides (well Kissinger was playing both Egypt and Israel sides in way).\u00a0 At a certain delicate point the US raised its nuclear alert level to so-called DEFCON-3[1]<\/a> to signal the Soviets Washington was committed to not letting Israel lose.\u00a0 Indyk describes the machinations in Washington in arriving at that decision.\u00a0 It took place at a bad time for Nixon.\u00a0 Watergate was blowing up.\u00a0 The famous \u201cSaturday night massacre\u201d when Nixon fired Special Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox, Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his deputy William Ruckelshaus took place four days earlier. \u00a0It has been well documented that Nixon was in his cups at the time and not part of the decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n OK, that\u2019s weird and scary that un-elected officials are making nuclear control decisions because the boss is looped.\u00a0 But Indyk doesn\u2019t stop there.\u00a0 He\u2019s unearthed documents and interviews from the Soviet side.\u00a0 It turns out Leonid Brezhnev was also out of the loop!\u00a0 He mixed \u201ccopious quantities\u201d of vodka with sleeping pills that left him unable to think straight.\u00a0 Consequently his staff was making decisions on his behalf. Not good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Well, you might take some reassurance that at least the staffers were solid or sober. But Indyk\u2019s research shows that both sides were acting on incorrect assessments of the other side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The nuclear balance needs attention.\u00a0 A lot can go wrong.\u00a0 The systems including the warning and control elements are old and I suspect of dubious reliability.\u00a0 The leaders likewise. The systems, physical and procedural need attention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> Defense Condition (DEFCON) levels go from 5 (lowest alert level) to 1 signifying nuclear war is imminent.\u00a0 DEFCON -3 highest is \u201cpeacetime\u201d level and forces need to be ready to mobilize on a very short timeline.\u00a0 There are large consequences to military posture at each DEFCON level.\u00a0 Personnel leaves are curtailed, airplane and ship patrols, submarines leave port, are changed, weapons bunkers are adjusted, communications change, satellites change, etc.\u00a0 It also has implications for NATO<\/strong> and forces deployed overseas. In short, the nuclear structure is a big machine with a lot of moving parts that can signal unintended things.\u00a0 Going to a higher DEFCON is not to be taken lightly. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Lot\u2019s of analysts are creating analyses of Vladimir Putin.\u00a0 What drives him? What are his objectives? Is he psycho?\u00a0 The fact is, no one really knows.\u00a0 Analysis that was likewise wobbly surrounded Saddam in his day. It was off the … Continue reading
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