From the description by President Trump and his top advisors, it\u2019s clear that they have learned from mistakes the US made with Saddam in Iraq.\u00a0\u00a0Trump’s bold move in Venezuela may suffer from other challenges, but at least they won\u2019t repeat the most tragic errors in Iraq.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, they are improving the tool that worked–economic pressure.\u00a0\u00a0Both Iraq Venezuela possess huge potential oil wealth and both Saddam and Maduro have squandered that resource.\u00a0\u00a0UN oil sanctions were put on Iraq following Saddam\u2019s 1990 invasion of Kuwait to modify Saddam\u2019s behavior.\u00a0\u00a0They did\u2026but not sustainably.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The US succeeded militarily in removing Saddam after giving him every possible incentive to peaceably leave Iraq (including substantial financial payment).\u00a0\u00a0Like Maduro, Saddam remained and was removed by force\u2014a major invasion was required (a surgical airstrike to kill Saddam before the invasion failed because intelligence was not correct).\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Planning for post-Saddam Iraq was imperfect to say the least.\u00a0\u00a0An option to pursue a limited objective of \u201ca change of management at the top\u201d was considered (and advocated by some) as a way of limiting the problems afterwards. The message to Iraqis in government and military would be “keep your heads down\u2014the top 2-3 dozen people may have to go, but you\u2019ll have a stake in the future post-conflict”.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This approach was rejected. The regime in its entirety was seen as guilty of all the horrors that were perpetrated under Saddam. It would be wrong to allow the continuation of the Baath party and the Iraq military. These points were strongly made by external Iraqi opposition members who argued in Washington that democracy in Iraq required wholesale structural change. These arguments proved persuasive to decision makers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Two disastrous decisions ensued\u2014ban the Baath Party and its members (following the mental model of the Nazi party in Germany) and fire everyone in the Iraqi military.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The two obvious consequences of this were: all the bureaucrats and technocrats who could run the critical functions of government were tossed out and the military was told they had no future and no paychecks, etc.\u00a0This was hundreds of thousands of people had no longer had a future in Iraq.\u00a0Oh, but they still had guns.\u00a0\u00a0(Alternatively, we could have given the message to military officers to return to barracks with your troops, the war is over. We will sort this out.) The insurgency was born within weeks of the invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the ideals of the Iraqi opposition rang true, the reality of running a government that can provide security and order for millions should have been prioritized over wholesale immediate reform.\u00a0\u00a0Opposition voices and reforms are important, but the chaos of complete disintegration of government must be avoided first.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The control of oil revenues in Venezuela also mirrors the Iraq case, but with a significant improvement.\u00a0Following the US-led war to expel Saddam from Kuwait in 1991, the UN Security Council passed a ceasefire resolution linking sanctions on Iraqi oil to various conditions, but notably Iraq\u2019s verifiable elimination of WMD (it really did have WMD then).\u00a0\u00a0Until this objective was satisfied, the UN would embargo oil exports.\u00a0\u00a0This was a powerful lever and Saddam\u2019s behavior did change (in fact, he gradually reduced his WMD capacity).\u00a0\u00a0The shortcoming of this tool was the consensus in the Security Council that existed at the end of the war, diminished over time.\u00a0\u00a0Increasingly, some member\u2019s support for the sanctions dropped\u2014especially as the pain on the citizens of Iraq became clear.\u00a0\u00a0Saddam could outlast the collective will of the Security Council.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, if Saddam satisfied the UN weapons inspectors that he had disarmed and the UN sanctions were lifted, who really believed that Saddam would not reconstitute those weapons?\u00a0\u00a0No one believed that the Security Council would agree to re-install the sanctions\u2014too many would have a stake in Iraq oil sales.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here again, Trump\u2019s stated position for Venezuela avoids pitfalls while retaining the leverage.\u00a0\u00a0First, unlike the case of Iraq in 1991, Maduro is gone.\u00a0\u00a0Second, the total dependence on oil exports is not throttled by international committee, but by a single actor\u2014Washington. Incremental progress toward a future Venezuela that the opposition and others seek can be pursued without the chaos that exploded in Iraq.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Setting aside the non-trivial questions of legality, the set-up that the Trump administration created has potential to produce a stable and productive future for Venezuela.\u00a0\u00a0There may be huge pitfalls unique to Venezuela, but from the experience of Iraq, it could work.\u00a0\u00a0Of course, sustained presidential-level attention will be required all along the way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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From the description by President Trump and his top advisors, it\u2019s clear that they have learned from mistakes the US made with Saddam in Iraq.\u00a0\u00a0Trump’s bold move in Venezuela may suffer from other challenges, but at least they won\u2019t repeat … Continue reading