Charles Duelfer | The Search For Truth In Iraq | Page 12

Response to US attack – Cyber?

Posted on August 28, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

It is hard to imagine Moscow or Tehran or Damascus doing absolutely nothing in response to a US attack. Will it be Cyber? If I were Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, that’s what I would be talking about with President Putin.

Washington has telegraphed a kinetic attack against some set of Syrian targets. There will be no question who did it. Washington is advertising the size and duration of the attack. If, as leaks are suggesting, the attack is 2-3 days it would appear to be about the same size or smaller than the strikes that President Clinton ordered in December 1998 against Iraq when their cooperation with UN weapons inspectors was found incufficient.

But, what will Syria, and others, do to respond to the US? The reponse may ber less directly attributable–especially if the Russians or Iranians play a role.

One possibility is that we will experience, a real cyber attack that causes serious damage to US economic interests. The Syrian Cyber Army has claimed credit for hacking the NY Times twitter today. This is an area where covert aid from Russian or Tehran could provide maker a big difference and be a good option for those parties. Real damage could occur to the US and we probably would not be able to attribute the blame on Moscow or other capitals.

The consequences of such an attack could be surprisingly large and the American people mystified at the price they have paid. Then what will the Administration do? Will we respond against Syria only? Respond against its backers Moscow or Tehran? We may not be able to tell if they helped Syria or not. Imagine the simple case that a handful of the worlds best offensive cyber experts join Syrian hackers for a few days in Damascus. If you believe what experts say about US infrastructure vulnerabilities then we could suffer real damage and be hamstrung about how to respond. The White House could find itself trying to manage a very different problem and conversation in a week or two.

If may be they we discover we have been hit and have little opportunity to respond in a way that doesn’t involve some escalation along a never before travelled path of cyber attack conflict.

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Sniper Attacks on UN Inspectors – Not Surprising

Posted on August 26, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Dr. Ake Seltron’s UN inspection team has now drawn sniper fire. Unfortunately, the UN inspectors are easy targets. To do their job, they have to be out in the open. Using highly visible UN SUVs may be questionable, but committed opponents can track team movements as they leave their hotels even in other vehicles.

Multiple parties have an interest in thwarting their activities. The Damascus regime itself not want them to do their job–but not want to be blamed for blocking them. Sniper fire is anonymous and can be blamed on either side. Rebels could easily order sniper fire that would be attributed to the Bashir Regime. The inspectors are going into a no-man’s land where many have died and no one will ever know who killed them.

During UN inspections in Iraq, the government was explicitly responsible for the safety of the UN teams–and for the most part they did this. There was not an on-going conflict. Damascus, apparently has made no such assurances for the current team. Likely, they have simply said, if you go into rebel territory, we can offer no protection. You are on your own.

Ake Sellstrom, the team leader, must make a careful choice about the risks his team will endure. Today he experienced a warning in this mornings attack which caused no injuries.

I lost four people and several severely wounded while leading the US Iraq Survey Group mission in Iraq during 2004. This included a VBIED attack on my own armored car (claimed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Two very good men were killed.

Dr. Sellstrom will need to make a decison about the risks of conducting his mission and how much he will learn that can’t be known any other way. Knowledge can be very costly. If the team sustains casualties, will UN leaders be able to say to the surviving relatives that the mission was worth it? Horrible choices face the weapons inspectors in so many ways.

The Secretary General should not leave the decison on proceeding with the team’s mission only to the team leader. They will be inclined to go, no matter the danger. Secretary Ban needs to take responsibility for that decison as well. He is in the best position to know the value of the expected results in the context of the overall objectives.

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Syrian Agreement for Inspections–Why?

Posted on August 25, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

If Damascus is permitting the weapons inspectors access to the sites of recent apparent CW attack sites (as reported Sunday 25 August 2013) then why, if they had a role in the recent attacks?

First, the weapons inspectors are only mandated to determine if CW agents had been used, not who used them. If the government was behind the attacks, the inspectors will only publicly confirm what appears obvious, that chemical agents were used. Damascus, could still maintain that there remains some ambiguity about who was responsible. Whatever the UN inspectors declare, it will be less definitive than what Washington is likely to declare. The result will still be that there is not a uniform international view on who is responsible (unless Russia and Iran are suddenly persuaded to reverse course on supporting Bashir–which would be a big surprise).

Second, if the US is now determined to conduct attacks on Syria, then the US will look bad if it launches strikes before the UN inspection process plays out. In a way, this would replicate the circumstances of George W. Bush in spring of 2003 when UN inspectors were still investigating on the ground when President Bush concluded independently of the UN that the time for military action had arrived. President Obama may find himself in the uncomfortable position of hoping the inspectors don’t get into the areas if the reports about taking military action are true.

As for the inspectors, they will have a difficult time operating in the area that is in rebel control. It’s obviously dangerous. Things can appear calm one moment–deceptively–and then attacks can occur. The areas may be contaminated. The sites have not been secure and evidence at some sites may have been “seeded”.” Nevertheless, they can take samples from the enviroment and victims, they can interview witnesses, they can collect debris, plot dispersal patterns, etc. These are all important…even after the passage of time.

As an aside, while their mandate is not to attribute responsibility for the attacks, data they collect, could point to the originator of the attack. For example, if they find debris of the munitions used to disperse the agent, that could say something about the origin. they nature of the munitions can tell something of the sophistication and potentially the manufacturer. For example, some CW munitions keep two separate reservoirs of constituent components of Sarin agent that are only mixed when a diaphram is broken when the munition is launched…thus the sarin is only created at the moment of use. This would indicate a sophisticated military weapon, not an ad hoc creation by non-state actors. But this is only one of dozens of things that inspectors might find.

The next few days will pose some dilemmas for all involved.

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Syria CW Use: Who crossed whose red-line?

Posted on August 23, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Did Bashir cross Obama’s redline, or the other way around? The perspective in Damascus may be different.

The Syrian situation has taken yet another turn for the worse. Which is to say it has become even more unpredictable.
The apparent use of a large coordinated chemical weapons attack on civilian targets by the Bashir regime whilst the UN inspection team was sitting in a hotel in Damascus suggests that deterrence has failed. But who was deterring whom?
I can not pretend to understand the mindset or logic of Bashir, but however he calculates costs and benefits or risks and gains, he seems to think ramping up defiance of the international community and increasing terror among Syrians is the path to take at the moment.
One possible explanation could be linked to Bashir’s previous statements that he would not use CW so long as there was no external intervention. Perhaps in his mind, there has been external intervention in the form of the infiltration of opposition forces trained in Jordan by the US, French and possibly the Israelis as reported in Le Figaro (22 August 2013). Bashir may have concluded that the outside world (and indeed the US) had crossed his redline, not the other way around.
For Washington, the Syrian war cannot be separated from the further complexities of grating tensions in the rest of the region. Jordan is extremely vulnerable and if it King Abdullah loses control of Jordan, then the chaos in the region will have gotten vastly worse.
For the White House, Syria also cannot be separated from domestic politics. President Obama has to be able to say he is doing something about Syria. The chemical weapon attack videos will force this even more.
Chemical weapons use stands out among the intersecting dynamics that no one can understand. Latching on to that salient element is perhaps unavoidable because it is tangible and the videos are so horrible. But, it is only one aspect of a tragedy that is spinning out of control.
In some ways Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is correct in condemning intervention because we cannot really predict the consequences. His comments that perhaps Syrian rebels caused the chemical weapons attack may seem ludicrous, but his objective is to thwart action military action that has no clear outcome.
Lavrov, it is worth remembering, was Russian ambassador to the UN during the key crises between UN weapons inspectors and Iraq in the 1990’s. At one point he accused the UN weapons inspectors of introducing nerve agent samples into Iraq—in effect planting evidence. It had the desired effect of shifting rational debate in the Security Council away from Iraq—whom Russia was supporting. Lavrov is very shrewd and has purpose behind his statements.
In the days ahead, I would carefully watch for Lavrov’s reactions. Russian dialogue with Damascus will have far more influence over Bashir’s behavior than statements from the White House.
Finally, the use of chemical weapons also indicates that the chemical stocks are no longer concentrated at a small number of secure sites. The risk of the dispersal or complete loss of control of these weapons in the Syria is growing. The US cannot confidently bomb these sites to destroy them. There are too many and the aftermath would likely make any accountability for the weapons impossible. In a sense, this risk allows Bashir to deter the US.

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UN Inspectors to Syria

Posted on May 7, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Many comparisons are being made between the Syrian and Iraqi circumstances regarding CW use.
Some background on the Iraqi case. The UN first became involved in Iraqi CW use allegations during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s. A small team of experts was constituted by the Secretary General to determine if CW had been used and by whom. They made separate investigations in 1984, 1986, and 1987. Most of their investigations were done outside the battle area (only in 1987 did they go into Iraq). Nevertheless, it was concluded that extensive CW use had occurred and was increasing. This was largely determined from the injuries–many were victims of blister agent (mustard) in addition to the nerve agent sarin. It was subsequently during the UNSCOM investigations of the 1990’s that Iraq used 101,000 chemical munitions against Iran. This was a massive military use–and it was very effective in countering the Iranian “human wave” attacks. By comparison with this use, the Syrian cases are minute–and they will consequently be far more difficult to investigate.
It is worth keeping in mind, that the use of CW in the Syrian case is quite different from the Iraq use against Iranian troops. The Iraqis had a military rationale. In Syria, the rationale for use–no matter who used them–doesn’t seem to be military, but to sow terror or cause international opprobrium.

The man selected to lead the UN investigation for the Secretary General, Dr. Ake Sellstrom, is a talented scientist who has strong experience–including as a weapons inspector in Iraq. He knows the difficulties in collecting data and credibly interpreting it for politicians who may seek to dispute any conclusions. It is important that there be at least one actor in this drama with an interest in establishing the truth. However, his task is going to be challenging if not impossible–even if he is permitted into Syria.

Sellstrom will have to provide his conclusions to an audience made up of political scientists for whom truth is a variable. I recall UN Security Council ambassadors twisted and coloring seemingly factual statements into shapes that suite their ends. Sergey Lavrov was brilliant at this. A redline in his hands would quickly become a flexcuff to bind the American ambassador to his/her chair. They didn’t stand a chance.

Other ambassadors could turn a seemingly direct linear presentation into a Calder mobile or a mobius strip. The Syrian situation is not one where the parties have a common interest in truth at this point. The politics needs to be fixed first. No matter how talented the UN inspectors, their truth will waste its sweetness upon the desert air.

Bearing in mind that the Syrian crisis is only about Syria for the Syrians. For all other parties, its about Iran, Jordan, Hezbollah, Israel, etc. The dynamics are far too complex for party to understand the knock-on consequences of any act. We don’t understand the range of dynamics, nor the perimeter of the problem we are trying to solve. It is a systemic flaw of our democracy and position as the leading power, that we are supposed to have a view on how to fix every problem on earth. At the daily noon press briefing at the White House all questions get raised–of course including Syrian. “Can you tell us what the President is going to do to solve the Syrian calamity?” Imagine the press spokesman say, “Nothing. Its too complicated. It is impossible to map the consequences of any action, so we are going to do nothing.” That sort of honesty has little survival value in Washington.

It is clear that whatever the US does decide to do, it can not avoid coordinating with Russia. Kerry seems to be engaged in that. That is a good thing, though I bet it is unpleasant. Lavrov will be extremely difficult. He will remember being trampled in the UN Security Council during the Kosovo crisis by Madeleine Albright. The US gave short shrift to Russia and I strongly suspect Lavrov and others will, all other things being equal, be happy to jerk around the US. Still, unless there is some common ground mapped out between US and Russia, Syria and the region will continue a death spiral. Jordon is becoming more precarious. Lebanon stability is suffering.

Against these major dynamics, the issue CW use is important but not necessarily paramount. Only if there is a loss of control of CW will the regional powers and the US and Russia being drawn together quickly. If CW stocks look to be issued and deployed or shared in ways where the central government has no control, then the CW aspect of this disaster will become a dominant factor. Until that point is reached, the work of Dr. Sellstrom may be interesting but critical. And if the use is so small, the truth will be fungible and easily confused. A key question, if CW was used, is who used it? Was it the Syrian government forces? Confusion is already added by the statement of another part of the UN. Comments from Carla del Ponte of the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry in Syria suggesting the source of Sarin use was Syrian opposition forces.

Dr. Sellstrom, I admire your courage and wish you and your team the best in your search for truth.

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Syria CW Conundrum – Risks, Options, Consequences and Mitigation Measures

Posted on January 13, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

So far, Syrian chemical munitions seem to have been protected and have not been used by the Syrian government. There were reports of steps being taken to prepare them for use, but it seems Syria has walked back from that direction.

However, the risks posed by Syria’s CW have not diminished. Steps are reportedly being taken by governments to deter their use, contain the consequences if they are used, and potentially destroy them militarily if that appears necessary. In the best of all possible outcomes, there will still be a massive problem in accounting for and disabling the extensive Syrian CW stocks and infrastructure. Below are some comments on each of these.

Deterrence is the highest priority. Governments have clearly made strong statements to Bashir on this point. Perhaps more importantly, messages must (and have been) conveyed to every level of command under Bashir to the level of the guys guarding the storage facilities. If CW is used, they will be held personally accountable.

Much of the work to contain the Syrian CW threat is done at this “personal” level. All military officers who have defected will be debriefed about CW munitions, infrastructure, organization, and staffing. It would be astonishing if extensive efforts to co-opt or recruit Syrian military with access to CW were not underway. The two fundamental questions asked by Washington and other capitals are, “Where is the CW?” and, “What are the intentions of the government?” Policies and actions (such as a military strike) are determined by the evaluations of these two questions. Another action to contribute to deterrence of transferring CW to other actors should be taken. False flag endeavors to elicit the sale or transfer CW to non-Syrian actors must be in place. Such offers would enhance deterrence by causing uncertainty among Syrians concerning any potential buyer and, it would provide information about Syrian CW security.

The New York Times and others have reported that activities are underway in Jordan and perhaps elsewhere to prepare regional governments to counteract CW use and take steps to deal with consequences should it be used. The US is quite aware of the massive problems in dealing with a CW contaminated battlefield. Preparations for the invasion of Iraq included extensive preparation to operate with full chemical protection gear. Fortunately this was unneeded.

Iran is also very familiar with CW consequences on the battlefield. They were the target of a hundred thousand CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran suffered tens of thousands of casualties as they attacked Iraqi positions with so-called human wave attacks. For this reason, it may be that Tehran would be more guarded about Syrian CW than commonly thought in the US.

The consequences on civilian populations were horribly evident in Kurdistan when Iraq used CW against its own civilian targets. Short and long term consequences are still being assessed decades later. What is clear, however, is that warning of an attack and simple protective steps can have substantial impact. Gas masks, plastic sheeting and duct tape can greatly improve survival.

Should the White House or other leaders conclude that the risks of Syrian CW use or the risk of Syrian CW falling into other hands was unacceptable, then it may be that the risk of a military strike is judged “the least-bad option.” But it would be an awful option. Any attack would presumably have to attempt to take out all sites at one time. Uncertainty on the sites and facilities would inevitably leave uncertainty concerning how much CW survived and no one could be certain of its security—even the Syrian government.

Moreover, even using munitions designed to incinerate the agent would have unpredictable contamination effects. The problem with these agents is that long term consequences are unknown and exposure areas would be hard to establish. Consequences of an inadvertent demolition of an Iraqi nerve agent storage facility in 1991 are still debated—despite extensive analysis as part of the investigation of Gulf War Syndrome. A key problem is that there may be consequences to exposures at levels lower than are detected by deployed meters.

Finally, in the best possible outcome, there is still a huge task. If the Syrian government passes and a new government accepts its responsibility to account for and eliminate CW weapons and facilities, this still poses a major challenge. The UN weapons inspection team in Iraq, UNSCOM (I was the deputy executive chairman) took years to try to verify the stocks and equipment for Iraq CW. And in the end we were still uncertain. Even Iraq, as it turned out, was uncertain how many munitions it had and what happened to them. UNSCOM supervised an incinerator and hydrolysis plant in Iraq from 1992-1994 to get rid of known CW agent. Some munitions were destroyed by explosives because they were too unstable to move. Some materials were too dangerous to destroy and were permanently entombed in giant bunkers.

UNSCOM also destroyed the production facilities dedicated to CW production. And, while we identified the Iraqi experts who developed the chemical weapons, we could not lobotomize them. The best experts simply found other, more productive things to do. Once released from the Saddam regime, they had better things they could do.

The international community should prepare for all of the above possible outcomes–especially the last one. A timely response by international inspectors to account for and eliminate the risk of Syrian CW would go a long way to reducing instability (military and political) that will inevitably follow the fall of the Bashir regime. We paid a big price for not being ready for success at the end of the Iraq war in 1991. It would be inexcusable to make a similar mistake now.

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Bashir CW Action will Unify Security Council – And NATO Will Bomb-And Iran?

Posted on December 6, 2012 by Charles Duelfer

NBC’s Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski (who has been working in the Pentagon longer than many of its current inhabitants have been alive) reported yesterday:
“The Syrian military is prepared to use chemical weapons against its own people and is awaiting final orders from President Bashar Assad, U.S. officials told NBC News on Wednesday.

The military has loaded the precursor chemicals for sarin, a deadly nerve gas, into aerial bombs that could be dropped onto the Syrian people from dozens of fighter-bombers, the officials said.”

If his sources are correct, and Bashir is proceeding down a path of preparing for use of CW against his own people, the UN Security Council will finally be unified in deciding he must go. Even the Russians (who have may be embarrassed if Post-Bashir weapons inspections find Russian connections to equipment used in Syrian WMD programs), will be compelled to support military action against Bashir. If Miklaszewski’s sources are correct and airdropped CW munitions by Bashir, then NATO forces will probably be forced to attack some or all of the Syrian Air Force. In a way, if Bashir uses aircraft and not missiles, the military problem is slightly easier, since aircraft are easier to locate and destroy than missiles. Moreover, this avoids the problem of bombing facilities that could house chemical agent with the result that the agent is dispersed with unpredictable lethal consequences depending on the wind among other things.

There is yet a larger consequence to this series of events. If Bashir is really going down this path, it suggests a pattern of thinking that from our perspective lacks logic, even sanity. This is the problem with depending upon deterrence as a response to WMD. Deterrence depends upon both parties acting rationally. If Bashir does elect to pull the trigger on his CW forces, it will have grave implications for how the US will view the Iran nuclear program. The relatively patient approach applied to date will be viewed as lame and risky.

How will Tehran see this? what would Tehran advise Bashir to do? We have no clue. And yet we have to make decisions that attempt to take the Iran situation into account. Whatever happens, and however we react, one thing is certain, there will be major unintended and unpredicted consequences.

Let’s hope Bashir and all those in his CW chain of command reflect upon the predictable consequences of their releasing CW in the conflict.

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Is Syria Playing Chicken with Chemical Weapons?

Posted on December 4, 2012 by Charles Duelfer

President Obama has publicly warned that any use by Syria of chemical weapons would have consequences. Reportedly US intelligence shows that CW related materials have been moved. It is unclear from the outside whether this indicates Syria has taken steps to load liquid agent into weapons warheads, or dispersed weapons away from their normal storage bases, or some other change to their status. However, assuming the intelligence is not a misinterpretation, or that Syria is not intentionally spoofing to test US collection capacity, then a couple of points are clear.

One, Syria would know that any movements, indeed any change in the facilities known to house CW-related weapons and materials (including chemical precursors and other associated components) would be seen by the US and others. A decision to move these items could only imply a decision to send a signal–an agressive one at that.

Second, the statement by President Obama while directed at Bashir, could have been more useful if it had explicitly stated that consequences would fall on anyone who implemented decisions to use CW. Senior officers should be deterred by knowledge that after the war, and the war will end, that charges and punishment will be levied on those who engaged in WMD use. Syrians will remember what happened to Iraqis. the US should be seeking to separate the interests of the senior military from the interests of Bashir. Clearly, many senior Syrians have defected. This is an effective strategy.

Finally, CW is not an effective weapon for military purposes in the conflict currently underway in Syria. It would however have a terrorizing effect on the population and could (as Saddam attempted to do in Kurdistan in the 1980’s) separate the local population from the opposition. But the international outrage should be clearly seen to offset any advantage. But who knows how Bashir calculates? We have no clue.

The Iranian dimension of this facet of the Syrian conflict is also very murky. Iran is reported to have provided some precursor materials over the years. Possibly they provided some expertise. Iran may be concerned that if Bashir falls then the connections with Iran will be broadly known, with potential damage to Tehran. Again, this is an area where we have no idea of the facts and dynamics, but it is clear that such factors are important.

To state an obvious risk, even if the government does not use the CW it may be moving, once moved out of the relative security of the bases it has been stored, it becomes more susceptible to capture or loss to one of the number of players–Hezbollah, al Qaeda, or others. This is a huge risk and Obama and others should be pressing Bashir not just to avoid using CW, but to keep it secure. Maybe this is in fact a thought by Bashir. Again, we have no clue.

One other reminder. Syria is reported to have biological agent as well. This, in the long run, could be more troubling if it got loose. Stay tuned.

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Investigations and Elections – Personal Experience

Posted on November 18, 2012 by Charles Duelfer

I have no idea what the facts are about the FBI investigation that led to the Petraeus resignation. I also do not know the details behind the investigation of the Benghazi Attack. However, I had the experience of investigation an extremely political issue just prior to a Presidential election. I was asked by CIA Director George Tenet to run the investigation of Iraq WMD in 2004–an election year. Among the earliest decisions I took were two that I feel to this day were critical. One, that I would have an detailed and completely declassified report. The Intelligence Community was attacked on all sides for everything and I did not want the public to thing there was hidden data or assessments lurking in any secret annex. It was a tough thing to get done in the bureaucracy, but I got the entire report and supporting data declassified and published. I would note that the White House supported this decision.

The second early decision I made was that I would complete the investigation and issue a comprehensive report the total picture of Iraq’s WMD–past, present, and future–before the election. I made this clear to the White House from the start. Our team was expending a lot of resources and, indeed, lives, to gather the data. It was a critical issue that had been at the heart of wars in the region on multiple ocassions. I did not want the report to be vulnerable to criticised for being in any way a political document–and it would have if I had let the work slide until after the election in November 2004. Here, again, the White House at the most senior levels, did not dispute my approach. I am convinced to this day that these decisions were the best for all concerned–whether they were politicians or not.

The track record evident to the public so far in both the FBI/Petraeus case and the Benghazi case look like incrementally bad decisions. It certainly appears that either explicit or implicit concerns about getting past the election played a role. It does not appear that anyone determined that they needed to conclude or report anything–even in a status report–before the election. Truth and credibility are in short short supply in Washington–particularly around elections. It is a shame to see intelligence and law enforcement arms of the government look increasingly political–even if they have explanations.

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Leading the CIA

Posted on November 14, 2012 by Charles Duelfer

The Petraeus resignation may look different if you are sitting in the CIA. A salient aspect would be the contrast between the standards Petraeus is reported to have ratcheted up inside the Agency and the ones he lived. During the past year, staff have been reminded of the sanctions against contact with journalists. Recent court cases demonstrate that this administration has been particularly vigorous in pursuing leaks to journalists.

The CIA also puts unique demands upon the personal lives of its staff. There are strict rules on personal conduct and relations (particularly with foreigners and journalists). Disciplinary actions are taken against officers who engage in inappropriate relationships. Officers, some with long successful careers have been terminated for such things. I would not be surprised if there were officers who had been terminated for actions not dissimilar to those of the Director…and during his tenure.

Petraeus has been praised for nurturing a relationship with the press. Being competent in the field is not sufficient for political success in Washington. However, his attitude of raising the enforcement of discipline at CIA also makes his own behavior subject to the same standard of scrutiny and his resignation, seems fully appropriate.

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