Charles Duelfer | The Search For Truth In Iraq

Coercive Disarmament in Iran: 1991 Iraq Model

Posted on March 9, 2026 by Charles Duelfer

The conflict with Iran will end with at least two elements:  One will be some sort of political agreement to cease hostilities. Second will be an intrusive weapons inspection mechanism to account for the Iran nuclear program (and possibly other WMD and ballistic missiles).

At the end of the 1991 Iraq war, both these elements were done with UN Security Council resolutions. This looks doubtful for the current Iran case, but there are important similarities with respect to the Iraq case.  

First, note the weapons inspection function in Iraq was not arms control, but coercive disarmament.  Iraq did not voluntarily agree to accept weapons inspectors.  It was coerced as part of a UN Security Council ceasefire resolution.  Basically, the inspectors (dubbed UNSCOM) could do anything, anywhere in Iraq, to account for and destroy Iraq’s WMD capabilities.  In addition, it was to conduct extraordinarily intrusive monitoring to assure Iraq did not reconstitute its programs–without end. Importantly, the UNSC linked lifting the embargo on Iraq oil sales with a positive report by inspectors that Iraq complied with these conditions.

It is important to note that the agreement was a “ceasefire resolution”, not a peace treaty.  If Iraq was found to be non-compliant with the terms (i.e. not cooperating with the inspectors), military enforcement could be re-commenced (and sometimes was).   

There were some structural problems with this arrangement, but it created the most intrusive set of inspections since the Versailles Treaty.  

I have no clue what end state President Trump envisions. Perhaps, he will only know it when he sees it, and it may depend upon circumstances at that moment (ok, this is different than pornography, but not entirely).   However, it is important that consideration be given now to what will be acceptable later. 

UNSCOM is not a perfect model for today’s circumstances.  The UNSCOM inspection regime was under the UN Security Council (but operated with a very strong US element).  It’s hard to imagine that happening again.  

The IAEA has the most expertise and current capacity for nuclear inspections in Iran. It will inevitably contribute in whole or in part (they have done a remarkable job under Director Grossi in very difficult circumstances).  IAEA played an important role in the coercive mechanism in Iraq in the 1990s.  Possibly coercive special authorities for IAEA could be agreed that would satisfy the US and others, but as a UN organization it must be responsive to a wide range of members—some with veto power.  So this seems doubtful.

It is also hard to imagine a unilateral inspection mechanism run by the US without some sort of international component. Maybe using the Trump-initiated Board of Peace?  Or some new purpose-built organization?  

I offer no specific proposal, but from long experience in Iraq, the details will be important. The task of credible accounting following a devastating war where records, buildings, equipment, have all be destroyed, dispersed or looted, will be extraordinarily difficult.  The skills involved will go beyond those normally associated with civil arms treaty inspections.  Think of destroyed bunkers with leaking toxic agents, the presence of unexploded ordnance, hostile domestic forces probably not under the control of a government, etc. 

Finally, the Iran war may not require US “boots on the ground”, but the post-conflict disarmament inspections will.  And the risks of casualties will be significant.

Forceful credibility should be the goal.

Posted in Allies, Chemical Weapons, Iran, Iraq, nuclear weapons, United Nations | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

The President is Wrong to Dismiss Allies

Posted on January 24, 2026 by Charles Duelfer

Thursday (22 January), President Trump was quoted saying our allies stayed back from the front lines in Afghanistan and, “We’ve never needed them… It has to be a two-way street”.

At the same time, I happened to be attending a gathering of special forces associations recognizing joint activities in Afghanistan.  The Norwegian ambassador Anniken Huitfeldt hosted the group at her embassy.  Those present included some of the most committed people from US, Norway, UK and France.  These people have all been at the very pointy end of the spear.  You could not find a group with a greater bond.  They have deployed together and trained together.  Seal team alums have crazy stories about doing some insane freezing cold training and missions with Norwegians in the far north in winter. 

The US can do many things by itself, but many things it cannot.  We need allies.  But we are making it hard for allied leaders and their countrymen to support the US.  Why should they buy American defense equipment if we denigrate their contribution to our joint interests? Yes, our NATO partners needed to spend more. Now they are, and we still insult them?  Bear in mind, the viewpoint in capitals is different from the viewpoint of those “downrange”.     

I suspect the President, did not think through what he was saying.  If so, he should correct the record.  If not, we will find operating in the world a lot more difficult. This will be true everywhere—Asia, the Gulf, Europe, etc.  Trade and security go hand in hand and both require partners.  There are multiple actors who feel they have given much to satisfy demands of Washington and are still being denigrated. 

In business, it is difficult to put a dollar value on “goodwill”, but companies know it is worth a lot.  For America, confidence in “the full faith and credit” of our country and currency is invaluable. The position of the dollar as base currency supports our extravagant debt and gives the US the extraordinary power of sanctions.  American full faith and credit to its allies provides the security that allows global US commerce and international security.  

We need to patch up our reputation. If not, we will pay a price and our opponents will reap the profits.     

Posted in Allies, NATO, Norway | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Venezuela: What Trump Learned from Iraq

Posted on January 5, 2026 by Charles Duelfer

From the description by President Trump and his top advisors, it’s clear that they have learned from mistakes the US made with Saddam in Iraq.  Trump’s bold move in Venezuela may suffer from other challenges, but at least they won’t repeat the most tragic errors in Iraq.  Moreover, they are improving the tool that worked–economic pressure.  Both Iraq Venezuela possess huge potential oil wealth and both Saddam and Maduro have squandered that resource.  UN oil sanctions were put on Iraq following Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait to modify Saddam’s behavior.  They did…but not sustainably. 

The US succeeded militarily in removing Saddam after giving him every possible incentive to peaceably leave Iraq (including substantial financial payment).  Like Maduro, Saddam remained and was removed by force—a major invasion was required (a surgical airstrike to kill Saddam before the invasion failed because intelligence was not correct).  

Planning for post-Saddam Iraq was imperfect to say the least.  An option to pursue a limited objective of “a change of management at the top” was considered (and advocated by some) as a way of limiting the problems afterwards. The message to Iraqis in government and military would be “keep your heads down—the top 2-3 dozen people may have to go, but you’ll have a stake in the future post-conflict”.  

This approach was rejected.  The regime in its entirety was seen as guilty of all the horrors that were perpetrated under Saddam.  It would be wrong to allow the continuation of the Baath party and the Iraq military.  These points were strongly made by external Iraqi opposition members who argued in Washington that democracy in Iraq required wholesale structural change.  These arguments proved persuasive to decision makers.

Two disastrous decisions ensued—ban the Baath Party and its members (following the mental model of the Nazi party in Germany) and fire everyone in the Iraqi military.   The two obvious consequences of this were: all the bureaucrats and technocrats who could run the critical functions of government were tossed out and the military was told they had no future and no paychecks, etc. This was hundreds of thousands of people had no longer had a future in Iraq. Oh, but they still had guns.  (Alternatively, we could have given the message to military officers to return to barracks with your troops, the war is over. We will sort this out.) The insurgency was born within weeks of the invasion.

While the ideals of the Iraqi opposition rang true, the reality of running a government that can provide security and order for millions should have been prioritized over wholesale immediate reform.  Opposition voices and reforms are important, but the chaos of complete disintegration of government must be avoided first.

The control of oil revenues in Venezuela also mirrors the Iraq case, but with a significant improvement. Following the US-led war to expel Saddam from Kuwait in 1991, the UN Security Council passed a ceasefire resolution linking sanctions on Iraqi oil to various conditions, but notably Iraq’s verifiable elimination of WMD (it really did have WMD then).  Until this objective was satisfied, the UN would embargo oil exports.  This was a powerful lever and Saddam’s behavior did change (in fact, he gradually reduced his WMD capacity).  The shortcoming of this tool was the consensus in the Security Council that existed at the end of the war, diminished over time.  Increasingly, some member’s support for the sanctions dropped—especially as the pain on the citizens of Iraq became clear.  Saddam could outlast the collective will of the Security Council. 

Moreover, if Saddam satisfied the UN weapons inspectors that he had disarmed and the UN sanctions were lifted, who really believed that Saddam would not reconstitute those weapons?  No one believed that the Security Council would agree to re-install the sanctions—too many would have a stake in Iraq oil sales. 

Here again, Trump’s stated position for Venezuela avoids pitfalls while retaining the leverage.  First, unlike the case of Iraq in 1991, Maduro is gone.  Second, the total dependence on oil exports is not throttled by international committee, but by a single actor—Washington. Incremental progress toward a future Venezuela that the opposition and others seek can be pursued without the chaos that exploded in Iraq.  

Setting aside the non-trivial questions of legality, the set-up that the Trump administration created has potential to produce a stable and productive future for Venezuela.  There may be huge pitfalls unique to Venezuela, but from the experience of Iraq, it could work.  Of course, sustained presidential-level attention will be required all along the way.

Posted in Iraq, Madura, United Nations, Venezuela, WMD | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

The “Successful” Strike on Iran

Posted on June 22, 2025 by Charles Duelfer

President Trump, Secretary of Defense Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cain all expressed great satisfaction with the military achievement of bombing three critical nuclear sites in Iran.  From the description of “Operation Midnight Hammer” provided by General Cain, it was indeed an extraordinarily complex mission with dozens of critical elements of Army, Air Force, Navy and Space forces.  To say nothing of the complex intelligence assets dedicated to the operation, prior, during and post-strike.  Indeed, synchronizing such a mission with thousands of moving parts is incredible.  President Trump declared that no other nation on earth could have done this. They were justifiably proud of all those involved. 

 That is one way of looking at it. 

However, another perspective offers some useful context.  Consider that it took all the incredible resources General Cain listed in an amazingly complicated operation (at very high cost), to blow up just three targets in Iran—a country with air defense that has been largely destroyed by Israel. The seven B-2s used are a third of the entire US inventory.

Analyzed by President Xi or Putin, they could conclude something different.  A good portion of America’s military/intelligence capability was absorbed by three (albeit very hard) targets in a relatively lightly defended country. 

I happened to be on an SAS flight on final approach into Dulles Airport at just about the exact time the B-2s were dropping their munitions in Iran.  I was returning from a trip to Norway where there were meetings on shipping in Ålesund, a town on the west coast.  Driving there from Oslo you experience amazing natural beauty. But almost as profoundly striking is the number of long, well-constructed tunnels through the very hard rock of Norway’s shear mountains.  Some are miles long.

According to Perplexity, Norway has around 1800 road and rail tunnels totaling over 1,000 km.  If you count hydropower tunnels there are thousands more (on order of 6000 km).  It would take a lot of B-2 “packages” to destroy even a few of them.

The point is not that the US will find it difficult to bomb the hell out of Norway (though some Norwegians may worry about that), but that our “peer” or “near-peer” adversaries may conclude something about US capabilities that is different than the impression of indomitable US military prowess we might like.  We should not deceive ourselves that we can deter our enemies convincingly based on the mission completed over Iran.  Tunnels offer an advantage to the defender as Hamas has demonstrated in Gaza.

By the way, a peace agreement will be a hard target as well. Pity the poor weapons inspectors who will at some point have to account for all the nuclear materials and equipment that has just been blown to smithereens. The experience in Iraq proved how challenging creating a WMD “material balance” in a post-conflict landscape can be. It is hard to imagine a resolution of the Iran conflict without a mechanism to assure the accounting of all their pre-war capacity. It is also hard to imagine an inspection regime that will satisfy the skeptics after war that has destroyed or dispersed equipment, materials and documentation. But that is another political problem and another case where the experience in Iraq is cautionary.

The Iran problem has not gone away. It will dog the Administration for the rest of its term one way or another. President Trump will own it even if the yesterday’s mission was a “one and done” military event.

Posted in Allies, China, Intelligence, Iran, nuclear weapons, Putin, Russia, WMD | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

Global Shipping: Can New Technology Leapfrog China’s Dominance?

Posted on March 24, 2025 by Charles Duelfer

I recently participated in a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Space.  It concluded, not surprisingly, that the US must prioritize all elements of US space development or risk ceding leadership to China.  The world now depends on space assets for economic and national security, a dynamic China deeply understands.

The same can be said for global shipping and navigational freedom on the seas.  Except China already has a long lead in global shipping. China recognized that growth of the global economy and China’s position depends on dominating shipping.  In successive five-year plans they shrewdly plotted and executed a strategy to achieve dominance. The US largely ignored shipping whilst preoccupied with Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on terror.  The 600-ship Navy that was a high priority during the Reagan Administration was forgotten, but not before naval warship construction choked off US capacity to produce competitive merchant ships.  This capacity is virtually extinct today.  

The US is waking up, as are our allies.  In his State of the Union speech to Congress, President Trump called out the American shipping problem and is charging an office in the White House to attend to it. 

The statistics that scream the message about China’s critical lead are obvious.  A US Trade Representative (USTR) report issued 16 January 2025 (i.e. the week before the Trump inauguration) contains a litany of statistics in support of their conclusion that China is achieving dominance through unfair aggressive and anti-competitive trade practices. 

A short quote from the report conveys the situation:

“China’s industrial targets have become more aggressive and sophisticated over the years. For

example, in the area of high-technology ships, China initially set a target of 20 percent of global

market share by 2011, but now aims to achieve 50 percent global market share by 2025. For

maritime engineering equipment, China initially targeted 10 percent of global market share by

2011, and now seeks 40 percent market share by 2025.

China’s targeting of these sectors for dominance has undercut competition and taken

market share with dramatic effect: raising China’s shipbuilding market share from less than 5

percent of global tonnage in 1999, to over 50 percent in 2023; increasing China’s ownership of

the commercial world fleet to over 19 percent as of January 2024; and controlling production of

95 percent of shipping containers and 86 percent of the world’s supply of intermodal chassis,

among other components and products.”

 (See full report, it’s really compelling:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/USTRReportChinaTargetingMaritime.pdf)

Of course, China’s “whole of planet” strategy to rule shipping includes dominating ports and shipping choke points.  The recent deal by a BlackRock-led consortium to acquire key port assets of the Panama Canal (as part of a large deal including 43 port facilities in 23 countries) was a surprising bit of good news.  However, I deeply suspect (and so do many China and shipping experts) it will never happen.  

CK Hutchison Holdings, owned by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-Shing, agreed to the deal without without consulting Beijing.   Reports say he is now the target of Beijing’s anger for allowing this big crack in China’s global shipping dominance strategy.  In a reverse of the Tik Tok situation President Xi Jinping can doom this deal and probably Li Ka-Shing too.  Recall Jack Ma, of Alibaba fame and fortune. He got cross-threaded with President Xi and the CCP.   Suddenly he went very quiet while the government cracked down on private enterprise.  It’s been a few years, but Jack Ma still maintains a very low profile.  Reportedly he has lost more than half his net worth (though still in the billions according to Forbes).  

So, how should address this problem?  China’s predatory actions to control the world’s lifeblood of commerce cannot be fixed by resurrecting old US shipyards.  Even imposing million dollar docking fees (as proposed by the USTR report, and now the Trump Administration) will not magically create modern shipyards. That would take a decade or more, massive investment, and then may not be profitable without continued support from high docking fees for competitors.  To begin to match China’s shipping strength we need to align with Allies with modern commercial shipbuilding yards.  Korea is one.  There are others.   

But even if we coordinate with Allies on new efficient shipbuilding capacity, this will not be enough.  We need to make a technological leap—that’s what we’re good at—and there’s a looming opportunity for an advance in commercial shipping.  In the way that reusable rockets transformed space launching, small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) can transform the commercial shipping.

SMRs of various sorts are advancing in commercial development.  They offer one of the best renewable power solutions for the planets ballooning need for electricity (think data farms among other things).  Public neuralgia from nuclear power plants is correctly diminishing.   The SMRs are as different from the giant reactors that created the nuclear meltdown nightmares (Three Mile Island) as dial telephones are to an Apple 16. 

The concept of nuclear ship propulsion is not new of course.  The US Navy has operated nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carriers for over 60 years.  The benefits are numerous. For one, no refueling for years on end. And besides saving fuel costs and related time, there is the absence of emissions from thousands of ships every day all over the planet.  Safety is also greater because modern nuclear sources are composed of encapsulated pellets that are far more resilient than conventional reactor sources.  

To be sure, safety and regulatory hurdles will need to be addressed, but the benefits certainly merit the investment.  Nuclear innovation has been stymied for decades. But, if any US administration can fix the lethal permitting process, this one can.   Facilitating a technological leap in the staid, but vital shipping industry would be a real and tangible breakthrough. If the US and its allies do not seize this opportunity to shape the future, no doubt, China will.  

For a good summary (2 pages) of the China’s shipping dominance see:   https://gcaptain.com/why-chinas-targeting-of-the-maritime-logistics-and-shipbuilding-sectors-for-dominance-is-important-to-the-united-states/

Posted in Allies, China, Global Shipping, Industrial Policy, Maritime Dominance | Leave a comment

DOGE and State Department

Posted on February 4, 2025 by Charles Duelfer

I would recommend anyone seeking to reduce the federal budget to begin by examining agency phone books—over time.  

I spent several years at State Department in the 1980’s and compared the 1984 annual directory (https://archive.org/details/telephonedirecto1984wash/page/n1/mode/2up?view=theater)

to the current directory (https://www.state.gov/telephone-directory/). Note: The State Directory on their website is a living document and is changing as the new administration makes adjustments. My description here is based on an archived version of the State Department Directory from 14 January 2025 on the Wayback Machine website: http://web.archive.org/web/20250114185131/https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Org-Directory.pdf.  

The growth and expansion of functions is astonishing.  What are all these offices?  What do the people do?  Where did they come from and why?  

There are a few more countries today, so there are a few more embassies and desk officers. (The UN recognized 159 countries in 1984 versus 195 today– recall dissolution of Soviet Union produced several.) But that is a small part of the picture.

Metrics can be deceptive, but it’s worth noting some categories that have gone up.   Back in 1984, there was a single deputy secretary of state.  Now there are two. The second for management and resources (I believe this is the only agency with two deputy secretaries).

In 1984 there were four Undersecretary positions and now there are six.  The number of Bureaus has increased from 18 to around 30. The increase has been in the number of functional bureaus, for example the latest one added just this year is the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy.  (One of their goals is to put one or two cyber experts at each embassy—that would be around 300 people, plus the support.) Bureaus are large organizational units and are composed of offices and branches.  There are lots of people and support arrangements.  Some of the more recent bureaus include:  Bureau of Diplomatic Technology, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the (large) Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of Energy Resources.

One source of massive growth is the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS).  It was created after the embassy bombing in Beirut in 1983. This bureau has roughly 35,000 staff now—about the size of the FBI. It has its own investigative and enforcement organization called Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) of about 2500 special agents.  They investigate passport fraud, provide security details for visitors, etc.  

However, the bulk of staff in the DS Bureau are contractors, local hires at embassies, and a million other things you probably never thought of.  During the Iraq war they hired a very large number of security contractors (like Blackwater).   BTW, just about every federal agency in Washington has its own police staff and cars, etc.  I remember seeing Library of Congress police cars years ago. What did they do? Overdue library fines? However, in 2009 they were combined into the Capitol Police, possibly saving some money.

Back to the State Department, one other category that has ballooned is the number of Ambassadors at Large, basically special purpose envoys for special topics.  In 1984, there were four:  The lead one was General Vernon Walters who really was special and conducted some very critical missions usually on presidential direction.  Today there are dozens of similar positions (all with offices and support staffs).     

The present State department staff seems to be around 77,000 counting all varieties and local hires overseas.  In 1984, it is hard to tell exactly but was substantially lower.  Of course, staffing numbers vary according to external events.  Viet Nam would created a bulge as did the war in Iraq. 

There have been some key organizational changes such as the elimination of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and putting all the functions (and people) into State Department.  There also have been changes in how foreign assistance is managed, especially in the 1990’s.  However, the Agency for International Development (AID) has remained a separate agency.  Its telephone directory has expanded too.

Growth occurs at embassies as well.  You might think all the people at embassies come from the State Department.  That’s not the case.  Another aspect of the growth of the US government is that almost every agency has its own little internal state department and frequently deploys personnel at US embassies.  NASA has an international affairs office called the Office of International and Interagency Affairs.  Likewise, Commerce, Agriculture, FBI, Energy, etc.  They all believe they have critical international relations that State Department cannot or will not attend to adequately.  Maybe they’re right.  But the net effect is it takes a lot of effort and more staff to then coordinate all these activities just in Washington. US staff stationed overseas are more expensive than domestic.  Security, housing, pay differentials, all add to the cost.

The overall State Department budget is roughly the size of the overall intelligence budget (comprised of 17 intelligence agencies now).  The intelligence community (a misnomer of course) has also gotten much larger with broader missions and functional divisions. If one can reduce the foreign affairs budget, it should be no challenge to reduce the intelligence budget…if you can find it.

And the Defense Department? The inefficiencies are legend, but the political entrenchments have encrusted the programs with layers of “cut insurance” that have defied revision for decades. For example, major contracts by major contractors will have cancellation liability clauses that make it more expensive to cancel a program in any given budget year (which is how congress passes budgets, when it does pass budgets) than to continue the program.

OMB, will be very busy in the next several months.  Will they operate with scalpels, knives, by tradition, or maybe chainsaws?  I would guess they may have to close the wounds resulting from the major surgeries of DOGE.

Posted in Defense Budget, DOGE, Intelligence, State Department | Leave a comment

Global Tensions Seen from Oslo

Posted on December 4, 2024 by Charles Duelfer

During a recent week in Oslo, I had the opportunity to talk with a variety of actors in government, defense industry, finance, military, and old friends.  Perspectives seem to have evolved since my last visit about a year earlier.  More worry about Russia, China, and the United States.

A few observations:

Norway is downrange.  The war with Putin’s Russia is present in Norway.  The conflict is taking place in Norway and in its territorial waters.  In American jargon, going downrange means traveling to the conflict zone somewhere else.  In Norway, you feel the conflict in your own backyard.  The hybrid war that is discussed academically in Washington is at hand in Oslo.  Cyberattacks, subsea cable cuttings, sea and airspace penetrations, aggressive intelligence operations, drones buzzing offshore oil platforms, etc. are all in a normal day for Oslo. China is ever present looking to expand business and “sitting on a hill watching tigers fight”. 

Norway is vulnerable.  At its northern point, in the increasingly strategic north, Norway shares a border with Russia and has territorial disputes especially regarding the Svalbard archipelago.  Russia was funneling migrants into Norway (and other countries) across their border.  Norway has been pointing to the growing threats in the far north while the US was preoccupied with the global war on terror. It is not only Russia—though Russia is most blatant, but also the Chinese.  Only lately has the US realized the strategic importance of the region—both with respect to northern sea routes, space tracking and access, undersea traffic, etc.  Joint exercises are now more regular, including in the Arctic.  When I was in Oslo, CVN-75 Harry Truman made a port call in Oslo following joint maneuvers with the UK.  

Norway is increasing its defense budget.  The NATO target is 2% of GDP for defense.  Norway has been consistent in meeting this goal and recently exceeding it substantially.  Their current long Term Defense Plan anticipates doubling the Defense budget over the next 12 years.  Former Norwegian PM Jens Stoltenberg just completed a critical 10-year stint as Secretary General of NATO.  He dealt with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and drove NATO members to rally against this threat.  Norway has acquired a fleet of F-35s. P-8 ASW aircraft and assorted other initiatives.  Besides resources, Norway has skills to offer–a former SEAL credited their Arctic training very highly. Still, like the Baltic countries, it is very vulnerable to Russia and China–especially if the backing of the US or NATO is wobbly.

Norwegian fears.  Norway was a founding member of NATO and was the only NATO member to have a direct border with Russia throughout the cold war.  They know the risks presented by Russia (and others).   The essence of NATO security derives from the commitment of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—i.e. an attack against one is an attack against all.  NATO now has 32 members with the recent addition of Finland and Sweden.  Some of these countries are very small (Iceland, Luxembourg, and Montenegro all have fewer than 1 million population).  Some are vulnerable for various internal reasons (North Macedonia, Hungary, perhaps others).  How solid is the NATO commitment?  That is a question that Putin is testing every day of his so-called Hybrid war.  

Earlier this year, there was a Russian-backed attempt to assassinate the head of Rheinmetall, a German firm producing 155mm artillery shells for Ukraine.  It was reported that Germany wanted to downplay the matter for fear of having to confront the reality of a Russian attack.  A fear expressed in Oslo was, what happens if Putin decides to take a little nibble out of Estonia (for example)?  Will NATO respond under Article 5?  Or will NATO resolve slowly erode? Stoltenberg was quite vigorous on the unity of Chapter 5.  However, not everyone in Norway is willing to risk their comfortable lives when Russia may offer Oslo separate assurances.  Norway reportedly has the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund and Norwegians live well from its unperturbed growth. 

And then there is China. In discussions with various people about the influx on Chinese electronics, communications, shipping, and the associated cyber risks, some shared the US view that responding to this was vitally important …perhaps to be polite.  However, others quite candidly stated it was too late to limit the threats of China’s looming dominance in several commercial and technological fields.  Since my last visit, multiple slick Chinese automobile showrooms have popped up in the most desirable retail blocks of Oslo.  It’s worth noting that Norway was very early in offering large government incentives for Tesla cars to address climate change concerns (or perhaps offset guilt from sustaining such a high standard of living from pumping oil). They were a critical first mover in supporting Tesla’s EV production.  Now China is on well on the way to supplanting them. And sucking up all the associated data and having a deployed vehicle fleet subject to manipulation from China.

Norway is the canary in the coal mine.  Norway is clearly a target for both Russia and China.  They have an outsized role in the west given their strategic location and resources.  Their population of about 5 million can be influenced like any other country through social media, threats and rewards. China shows skill and offering pain or pleasure in trade.  Watch Norway to see how Putin’s threats/rewards shape attitudes.  And watch China’s more subtle influence grow in Norway and the Arctic overall. The former and future President Trump has said good things about Norway.  Norway has been a resilient leader through thought and actions for the rest of Europe.  We need them.  They need to know we will be resolute. 

Posted in China, NATO, Putin, Russia, Space | Tagged , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Houthis in Space, or: Ruining it for All Mankind

Posted on August 13, 2024 by Charles Duelfer

The acceleration of commercial, military and scientific space activities in recent years has been astonishing.  Technology has evolved to point where space-based activities are demonstrably very lucrative.  Satellites in low earth orbit are increasing exponentially (really, see chart below).  Launch costs have plummeted and capabilities for small cheap commercial satellites have grown (communications and commercial earth observation in particular).  A recent McKinsey /World Economic Forum Report  estimated the market for space to be $1.8 trillion in 2035 (https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-defense/our-insights/space-the-1-point-8-trillion-dollar-opportunity-for-global-economic-growth).

(Chart from AEI Space Navigator[1])

SpaceX has led this incredible growth.  According to astronomer Jonathan McDowell, SpaceX CEO, Elon Musk has launched 6281 Starlink satellites for just his commercial broadband service (as of 6 August 2024 see https://planet4589.org/space/con/star/stats.html)[2]  But this commercial enterprise will shortly be joined by Amazon’s Kuiper network and Eutelsat’s OneWeb network.  

More importantly, and inevitably, at least two Chinese companies are in rapid pursuit.  What Elon does, China does more and cheaper.  As Tesla electric vehicles (EVs) were first movers, cheaper Chinese EVs will soon flood the planet.  In space, a Shanghai space communications company just launched the first of 14,000 satellites (the satellites successfully deployed, but the booster exploded into hundreds of pieces adding another large swarm of space debris to the mix). And there’s a second commercial Chinese company about to start launching a 13,000-satellite constellation.  They will challenge SpaceX’s lead just as they challenge the world EV market. The US may have to try out tariffs on space-based broadband services in addition to tariffs on Chinese EVs made in Mexico. The likes of a debate over TikTok and Huawei 5G mobile technology is inevitable. (Of course, China is also duplicating SpaceX in developing reusable launch vehicles to reduce cost.)

The above selection of well-known facts provokes the question, “Is this out of control?”  And, of course, the answer is, “Yes, it is out of control.”

The space race is back.  Fifty years ago, the UN Outer Space Treaty was agreed (for description and text see https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html).  That has been the international legal foundation for global space activity.  

At the time it was agreed, there were two space powers with a small number of satellites—mostly launched by the US and Soviet Union governments.  

But now there are many new factors that make space more unmanageable and more competitive.  For example space is now:

— Accessible to any country/person with relatively modest resources 

–Very lucrative commercially 

–Increasingly important for national security 

-nuclear forces depend on space assets for warning, intelligence, communications and control

-conventional forces depend on space for communications, navigation weapons guidance, etc.

-intelligence collection of all sorts

                  — Essential for terrestrial commerce, GPS, communications, internet, etc.

–Becoming really congested in critical areas.  Space is real estate and certain locations are far more valuable than others. 

The UN espouses the view that space is a common good for all mankind.  That sounds good, and many worry that space is the last place mankind has a chance to agree on something for the benefit of all mankind. There are many who strongly work for this ideal and see the current situation as one where wise global leaders have an opportunity to do the right thing. 

  Central to advocating these ideals is The UN Committee on Space with its standing office, with the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs. They are trying to manage the blossoming array of issues. They are trying to bring order through international agreements on rules and behavior as is the case with other “common goods” like radio frequencies, maritime rules and boundaries and air traffic control procedures.  Compliance and verification are, as always problematic.  They are like a fire department with only a megaphone.

Such endeavors to assure order, for the common benefit are essential, but limited in effect.  It is essential to prepare for non-compliance.  That’s where the Houthis can inform the debate. 

“What would the Houthis do?”   The Houthis have surprisingly advanced weapons systems.  Their missiles and drones have a range of hundreds of miles. They have disrupted major sea lanes and the US military with its allies have not been able to deter or prevent them.  

Unlike the US and other countries who may intentionally violate international rules at times, the Houthis have virtually nothing to lose.

The Houthis figured out we have something big to lose and they can attack it.  It’s not a great leap to imagine Houthis launching missiles to orbital altitudes to disrupt that common area. Their reasons for acting are hard to predict, to say the least.  Maybe they receive some visions unconnected to Earth or space.  

Of course, recent attention has focused on Russia’s potential to wipe out low earth orbit with nuclear explosive generated electromagnetic pulse weapons.  But Putin is an actor with some common interests and predictability. 

So, complicating the consideration of international space management, the democratization of space, open to all, well that does present problems.  Ideals are great, but spoilers, with their own higher calling can mess up everything.  

Conclusion: The two key players with greatest stake in space (and on Earth), the US and China will have to reach a meeting of the minds. We have much to contest with China, but we both have an interest in managing risks in space and deterring others from ruining it for all mankind. 

[1] To see the full range of space growth “hockey stick” graphs in all categories of function and country, see the American Enterprise Institute’s excellent “Space Data Navigator” at https://spacedata.aei.org

[2] Astronomers are keenly interested because the sky is literally going dark with the projected profusion of satellites, rocket bodies, debris, etc.  It’s interfering with their ground observations.

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Israel and Iran – Remember 1991 Iraq

Posted on April 15, 2024 by Charles Duelfer

In January 1991 I happened to be running the task force in the State Department Operations Center set up for Desert Storm.  President George H. W. Bush had gone to enormous effort to assemble a coalition of over 30 countries to either convince Saddam to evacuate Kuwait or force him to leave.  It was painstaking diplomacy, military planning and coordination on a global scale.  A coalition of military forces is extremely complicated to manage.  Force assignments for sectors on the ground, air, and sea must be allocated.  Communication protocols and plans must be made.  Different radios, map grids, air battle sectors, target identification and allocations must be agreed?  

Integrated air operations require battlespace management and common data bases so friendly forces are identified as friendly and enemy, not.   This was a huge complex undertaking…and I haven’t even mentioned the complexity of logistics.  Distributing fuel, spare parts, munitions, etc. to multiple forces can’t be taken for granted.  It worked.

But, at the very start of the military campaign to expel Iraq from Kuwait, we received a jolting critic message from the Pentagon.  Scuds were detected on launch and initial target prediction was Israel. We had no idea if Iraq was using WMD warheads (they really did have CW and BW warheads in 1991).

What would Israel do?  They were not part of the coalition for obvious reasons—Arab states would have balked completely.   From Saddam’s perspective, hitting Israel would draw them into the mix and force splits in the coalition opposing him.  

We were aware of the potential Israeli nuclear capability (so was Saddam) and if Iraq did use chemical or biological agent, it was not inconceivable Israel would respond with overwhelming force—nuclear.  Israel was unpredictable and worried about Israel, not the rest of the planet.

Of course, this went to the President swiftly and conversations with then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir ensued.  Israel said they must respond—it was a matter of their survival.  

They could not depend on anyone else to defeat their enemies.

President Bush sent the formicable Deputy Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger and a team to Tel Aviv to walk Israel back from the precipice. Of course, the argument was made that Iraq would be defeated by the 500,000 troops, multiple carrier battle groups 1300 plus combat aircraft, etc. painstakingly assembled by the coalition.  If Israel attacked Iraq, it would break the coalition.  Israel could never muster the force that the coalition presented against Saddam.   Prime Minister Samir didn’t seem to care.

So begin a difficult negotiation with Israel which demanded more Patriot air defense, more direct intelligence on missile launches, AWACS aircraft patrols, etc. etc.

These were the carrots.  There was also one very considerable stick.  The coalition would not share deconfliction data.  This meant Israel aircraft could not enter the coalition air operation zone without risk of either being attacked or being unable to identify friend or foe.  This was real leverage.  It was painful for all concerned.  

As it turned out Saddam used only conventional or even just cement warheads—not WMD.  US provided Patriot missiles had very mixed results…many warheads did impact in Israel.  Moreover, citizens took chemical weapons precautions which created great fear.  Still, Israel held back, the coalition dealt with Saddam and Israel reaped the benefits.  Iraq was never a real threat to Israel again. Israel’s external threat was greatly diminished for many years. 

With respect to Iran’s attack on Israel, much is similar and much different.  Yet, again we face the condition where Israel may act in its own interests irrespective or the rest of the region (or planet).  This past weekend, a remarkable coalition, assembled on short notice, worked with Israel to defend against Iran.  Coordination of military operations among various parties for air defense is an incredible achievement.  Israel stands to lose the benefits of integrated defense with partner nations depending on its next steps.  If Israel determines that only it can assure its own defense, a huge opportunity will be lost and the consequences for Israel and the rest of us may be huge. Like the US, Israel cannot fully defend itself without allies. Hyenas stalk and kill the isolated.  

The opportunity before Israel is great in terms of building its own coalition, potentially even broadening the possibilities for a post Hamas management of Gaza.  Possibly, something good could come out of this…if Israel can see its way to forward.

Posted in Allies, Chemical Weapons, Gaza, Gaza,Hamas, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Israel, nuclear weapons | Leave a comment

A Houthi State on Bab al-Mandab?

Posted on February 20, 2024 by Charles Duelfer

Can the UN Security Council accept a settlement of the Yemen conflict which does not mandate adherence to Freedom of Navigation?

It appears the Houthi leadership in Sana’a aspires to be to the Bab al-Mandab, as Egypt is to the Suez Canal.  This is to say, in control of the transits and deriving a continuous revenue stream.  It also seems that Iran is quite happy with supporting this outcome.  To the extent Iran controls the Houthis, it will be able to squeeze the twin carotid arteries of shipping at the Strait of Hormuz on the Gulf side and the Bab al-Mandab on the Red Sea. Iran control over maritime access on both sides of the Arabian Peninsula is being demonstrated by the Houthis maritime attacks. 

The US military and its allies have tried to counter the Houthis attacks which have effectively choked commerce through the Red Sea. They have not succeeded, though the US Navy has expended a substantial fortune on munitions.  Vice Admiral Brad Cooper DCINC of CENTCOM stated in a 60-Minutes News interview two days ago that they have expended about 100 Standard Missile 2s to defend against the attacks by anti-ship ballistic missiles.  This is the first time such advanced missiles have been used in combat against the US Navy or commercial shipping.  Of course, these advanced weapons were provided to the Houthis by Iran.  And Iran is learning very valuable lessons from their use in combat.

So far, the SM-2 missiles have been successful.  However, Vice Admiral Cooper, mentioned that they cost about $4 million each.  So, the US military has spent over $400 million just on those munitions.  They have consumed many others, including precision aerial bombs and cruise missiles to attempt to disarm Houthi facilities. 

This is a very expensive engagement where US costs far exceed the costs of the attacker.  I have no idea how depleted our munitions stocks are, but this is another case where we are using munitions that will take years to replace against third tier opponents.

China must be watching and counting, at a minimum.  It was hard to escape noticing that the Iranian Ship “Bershad” was, until yesterday, moored (according to AIS data) in Djibouti waters…perhaps a mile or two, from the PLA facility on the Djibouti shore.  This is the ship that the US acknowledged conducting cyber actions against.  It was reportedly providing targeting information to the Houthis for their maritime missile attacks.  The Chinese have been mysteriously quiet about the threats to international shipping (lots of China’s shipping passes this way.) 

All of this poses a nasty dilemma for the pursuit of Yemen peace negotiations.  The de facto truce on the ground has been prolonged presumably because there is some interest by all parties in a political solution of some sort.  A roadmap of steps forward has been created after much effort.  The Houthis state publicly that the peace dialogue is separate from their attacking ships in waters off Yemen. Those attacks are outside Yemen.  Forgive me for not being relieved about that distinction.

Would it ever be acceptable, to have a government in Yemen that has established its control over the Bab al-Mandab and is in effect, charging fees for passage?   Can the US impose a military solution to this and every other similar conflict?  Do we have enough munitions?

The UN-led negotiations on Yemen have become much more complicated.  The existing framework for those negotiations was already a bit out of date.  The new circumstances require the UN Security Council to agree that freedom of navigation must now be part of any solution.  UN Negotiator Hans Grundberg’s job is now far more complicated.  The UN  Security Council should make clear that adherence to international norms for freedom of navigation must now be part of the solution.  Ambiguity is not useful on this issue.

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